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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - VALIDITY OF STATE UsE TAX ON MAIL ORDER
SALES OF FOREIGN CORPORATION - The respondent, a New York corporation
licensed to do retail business in Iowa, did a large mail order business there also.
Iowa customers sent orders by mail to the company's warehouses located outside
that state, and the merchandise was shipped directly to the purchaser. On these
mail order sales the company neither collected from its customers, nor paid to
the state, the Iowa use tax.1 The petitioner, chairman of the state tax commission, threatened to cancel the respondent's license as a retailer and its permit
to do business in Iowa unless such use tax were paid. 2 Respondent obtained an
injunction against such action in the Iowa Supreme Court on the ground that
the statute, as applied, violated section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, two justices dissenting, that the
Iowa use tax is not unconstitutional since there is no discrimination against interstate commerce and since the burden of collecting the tax was in return for
the privilege of doing business in Iowa. Nelson. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (U.S.
1941) 61 S. Ct. 586.
The use tax was originally conceived to prevent local consumers from evading the sales tax by making out-of-state purchases.3 The tax is a correlative

1 "An excise tax is hereby imposed on the use in this state of tangible personal
property ••• at the rate of two percent of the purchase price of such property. Said
tax is hereby imposed upon every person using such property within this state. • ••"
Iowa Code (1939), § 6943.103.
2 Authority for such action is found in Iowa Code (1939), § 6943.122.
8 13 NoTRE DAME LAWY. 75 (1937). The necessity for the use tax was minimized by the recent significant case of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,
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to the sales tax, usually levied at the same rate, and exempts such goods as are
purchased within the state and are subject to the collection of the sales tax.4
While the Supreme Court has rejected a tax establishing an economic barrier
against the products of a neighboring state,6 a state is not precluded from imposing a nondiscriminatory tax upon the use or enjoyment of property in the
taxing jurisdiction simply because the property has passed through the channels
of interstate commerce before coming into the state.6 The Court sustained the
sales tax in the Berwind-Wmte case 7 by segregating the transfer of possession
to the purchaser from the interstate transaction and calling the former the local
tax base. The principal case follows the same process of breaking down the interstate sale into its component parts, the use by the purchaser in Iowa being the
segment here taxed. 8 The artificiality of the view that the tax is levied against
the use in the state as divorced from interstate commerce bars the formulation

309 U.S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388 (1940), in which the Supreme Court held that the buyer's
state could levy a sales tax on the product of an interstate sale. 7 TAX POLICY, No. 2
(Dec. 1939). But where, as here, the statute requires the corporation to act as the
agent or the state in collecting the tax, the use tax could be as effectively administered
as the sales tax. To that extent, the use tax is still helpful to the state. See comment on
this general subject in 38 M1cH. L. REv. 1292 (1940).
4 lowa Code (1939), § 6943.104 provides: "The use in this state of the following tangible personal property is hereby specifically exempted from the tax imposed in
this chapter: I. Tangible personal property, the gross receipts from the sale of which
are required to be included in the measure of the tax imposed by division IV of chapter
329.3 ..•." This last chapter is the two per cent Iowa sales tax.
6 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 5u, 55 S. Ct. 497 (1935), forbidding a state to use its police power to create an interstate tariff barrier.

6 24 CoRN. L. Q. 248 (1939); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642,
41 S. Ct. 606 (1921); Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 43 S. Ct. 643
(1923); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 49 S. Ct. 188 (1929); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345 (1933); Wiloil Corp.
v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358 (1935); Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937). See Lockhart, "The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce," 52 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1939).
7 McGoldrick v. Berwind...White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 at 49, 60 S. Ct.
388 (1940), stating: "Its [the tax in question] only relation to the commerce clause
arises from the fact that immediately preceding transfer of possession to the purchaser
within the state, which is the taxable event regardless of the time and: place of passing
title, the merchandise has been transported in interstate commerce and brought to its
journey's end." See note 3, supra.
8 The majority, speaking through Justice Douglas, declared that, "Use in Iowa is
what is taxed regardless of the time and place of passing title and regardless of the
time the tax is required to be paid." Principal case, 61 S. Ct. at 588. The dissent,
through Justice Roberts, pointed out that, "Delivery to a designated carrier is delivery
to the customer and, in this case, is completed outside Iowa." 61 S. Ct. at 592. The
Berwind-White case was said to be "distinguishable from the instant case for there
the decision was grounded on the fact that the transfer of title and consummation of
sale depended upon delivery by the seller in the taxing state." 61 S. Ct. at 593.
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of workable principles in this field of taxation.9 The Court regards the requirement that the Sears, Roebuck Company act as the state's agent for the collection
of the tax as the "nub of the present controversy," and cites the case of Mona,motor Oil Co. 'i/. Johnson 10 to the effect that no unconstitutional burden on a
foreign corporation is thus imposed. That aspect of the cited case is not free
from criticism,11 but the Court in the principal case brushed the argument
aside.12 In view of the past approval the use tax has received in the Supreme
Court,1 3 the result of this case is not surprising, though a more candid approach
to the economic and legal problems involved might be desired. 14

9 See 38 M1cH. L. REv. 1292 (1940). The author of that comment calls for
the admission "that interstate commerce is being taxed" and the destruction of
"existing hypertechnicalities" so that "the ground is cleared for a rational and practical
development of other principles of state taxation in this area." 38 M1cH. L. REV.
1292 at 1300.
10 292 U.S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575 (1934).
11 Warren and Schlesinger, "Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays
Its Way," 38 CoL. L. REV. 49 at 78 (1938), criticize the Monamotor case as follows:
"granting the tax on the consumer to be constitutional as one on a transaction whose
interstate character would cease in the consumer's hands, was the collection provision
valid as to the interstate sale? That is, granting valid taxability, is there also constitutional collectibility? The latter does not of necessity follow from the former; the
tax burdened one engaged in local use, but collection burdened one engaged only in an
interstate transaction. It would seem, therefore, that the Court was guilty of hiatus
in jumping from its conclusion of valid taxability to that of constitutional collectibility."
12 See, however, the dissent of Justice Roberts.
13 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937); and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389 (1939).
u The court apparently has not yet been won over to the view of Justices Black,
Frankfurter, and Douglas (although Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in the
principal case), who would destroy the last vestiges of the immunity doctrine and
admit that the state may tax interstate commerce, subject only to the provision that
such taxes be nondiscriminatory and consistent with the acts of Congress. 38 M1cH.
L. REV. 1292 at 1307 (1940). Cf. Justice Black's dissent in Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938), and Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939).

